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On October 6th, 2018, the UN International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a 
report on the different effects that a 1.5 and 2-degree Celsius temperature increase would have on 
the earth, and what would be needed to prevent anthropogenic climate change from continuing 
beyond these points. The report noted that for anthropogenic climate change to stay at or below 
1.5 degrees, “[models require] global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions [to] decline by about 
45% from 2010 levels by 2030” (UN IPCC).  Furthermore, the report noted the dangers that 
would be presented by breaching 1.5 degrees, stating that 10 million fewer people would be 
displaced by sea level rise and several hundred million less people would be susceptible to 
poverty in a 1.5 degree scenario rather than a 2 degree scenario (UN IPCC). These results are 
themselves notably dire, yet the possibilities for mass migrations and increased economic 
inequality have the potential to create a political climate that is extremely unstable (Schleussner 
et al. 2016). Despite the urgency needed in action and the extreme effects that will occur without 
action, significant governmental action to prevent climate change has not been forthcoming 
(McKinnon 2014). Furthermore, large segments of the global population either full scale deny 
climate change, or believe that climate change isn’t pressing enough to necessitate action (Fleur 
2015).  
The lack of action on climate change can be depressing to many climate activists, as are 
the apocalyptic scenarios that climate change could lead to. Indeed, this depressing combination 
of politics and science has led theorist Dale Jamison to write that “we must accept that ‘the 
struggle against climate change has failed’ and begin to come up with ways to live with that 
reality” (Lane 2016, 119). Even if not all concerned citizens agree with Jamison, the combination 
of possibilities scientists report, and the present lack of government interest in stopping climate 
change, can paralyze concerned citizens from engaging in political climate action (McKinnon 
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2014, 31). In this political climate, which has the possibility to paralyze citizens from climate 
action through despair, better understanding how internal conceptions of climate change may 
lead concerned citizens to become more passionate as political climate activists would be useful.   
I intend to start to provide such a framework. I shall explore what motivates climate 
action in the United States. I narrow my focus from global to national because United States 
action on climate change is likely to be a necessary condition for international climate 
agreements to be effective (Meyer 2016). My other narrowing will be in the form of context. I 
shall limit the context of my discussion to how the different elements of hope and fear–
themselves forms of mental framing–affect the propensity of citizens to engage in climate action. 
My considerations of sacrifice and injustice shall thus largely be extensions and applications of 
the arguments about hope and fear. 
In my first section, I shall explore why hope and fear are not the mutually exclusive 
concepts they at times seem to be, but instead two different elements that must both be present in 
any mental framework that is to promote climate action. Second, I explore how a desire for 
unconstrained economic growth and the related concept of consumer sovereignty have caused 
climate change in such a manner that requires activists to take a group oriented political mindset 
in combatting climate change. Third, I reason that climate change activism must be understood 
from the outset as a form of sacrifice so as to properly conceive of what activism will entail. 
Forth, I explore how the synergies between sacrifice and hope and fear provide additional 
benefits to each concept. I argue that political climate activism is best inspired by an 
understanding of climate change as a yet avertable slide toward an apocalypse that will sacrifice 
the future of mankind and thus do great injustice on future generations.  
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Before I continue to the substance of my paper, I will define the form of activism I am 
looking to promote. As shall become clear in the section on the normative roots of climate 
change, I do not believe that personal acts of energy saving are enough to prevent the worst 
effects of climate change. As such, I look to definitions of political action that are centered on 
groups of concerned citizens who themselves do not have the ability to unilaterally make 
systemic changes. Hannah Arendt’s somewhat controversial definitions of what constitutes 
political power provide a framework that addresses these goals. According to Arendt, “power 
springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse” (Arendt 
1958, 200). Based off Arendt’s definition, I shall, for the context of this paper, define “political 
climate action” as the coming together of people to achieve the goal of in some manner 
preventing climate change. The utility in such definition shall become further apparent as the 
paper progresses.  
 
Hope and fear 
I assert that to be properly motivated to engage in political climate action, a certain belief 
in the potential for climate change to result in an apocalyptic end of humanity, or life on earth, is 
necessary. This assertion is by no means obvious, as there has been substantial discussion among 
theorists, activists, and scientists, as to whether framing climate change in terms of an 
apocalypse is helpful. Indeed, Robin Globus Veldman (2012) argues that many 
environmentalists (excluding herself) believe “apocalypticism hinders activism, whether by 
encouraging fatalism or skepticism, risking self-fulfilling prophecies or alienating moderates” (1-
2). Velman’s disagreement with other theorists regarding apocalypticism is indeed but a subset 
of the larger discussion of how fear and hope should be used to promote climate activism. This 
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discussion is indeed large enough that theorist Melissa Lane mentioned it in her review of the 
contributions of political theory to climate change (2016).  
Veldman enumerates an argument that envisioning climate change as leading to an 
apocalypse, or “apocalypticism,” is not only useful in portraying climate change, but indeed a 
primary cause of activism. Continuing, Veldman notes “a fair amount of environmental activism 
occurs not despite apocalypticism but because of it,” and that “environmentally apocalyptic 
views are often associated with activism” (2). Indeed, there is empirical evidence supporting the 
idea that climate change activism is promoted by fear: according to Roser-Renouf et al. (2014), 
variable regressions have found climate change activism to be promoted by greater risk 
perceptions from climate change (164).  
Despite the convincing argument Veldman makes for climate activism being promoted 
by apocalyptic viewpoints, Catriona McKinnon (2014) argues the seemingly contradictory 
argument that hope is of “instrumental value” in leading people to political climate action (45). 
McKinnon proceeds to define hope as the opposite of despair, claiming despair “is typically a 
debilitation of the will” (35). Furthermore, McKinnon claims that to despair about climate 
change is philosophically unjustified (31).  
While Veldman and McKinnon’s arguments might first seem to be mutually 
contradictory, they are in fact are arguing about different things. Veldman’s argument is about 
the eventuality that climate change will lead to apocalypse, though she mentions that in her 
conceptualization of apocalypse this eventuality can yet be averted (2012, 5). McKinnon’s 
argument instead is that hope in one’s attempts to stop climate change is necessary (2014, 40). 
The key distinction here is that Veldman is arguing for how people should view the potential 
results of climate change, should activists not step up. By contrast, McKinnon is arguing that one 
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needs to have enough internal efficacy to believe that there is some hope that one’s actions will 
prevent climate change. In essence, McKinnon is arguing that people need to feel like stepping 
up will make a difference. It is thus apparent that despite McKinnon’s suggestion that “doom and 
gloom” politics are unjustifiable, there is nevertheless room for exactly such arguments given 
that they are put in the correct context. This context is that of apocalypse: it is possible to believe 
that climate change is likely to cause an apocalypse–a frightfully gloomy scenario–even as one 
still believes there is some hope in personal action.  
It is useful to view a more tangible example of fear combining with efficacy to prompt 
action. I posit that voting is just such an example. Fear was used on both sides of the political 
aisle in the 2018 election in an attempt to get out the vote: The Republicans employed frightful 
images of a migrant army even as Democrats warned of the danger president Trump presents to 
Democracy. It is thus clear that political strategists believed fear to be instrumental in motivating 
voting. At the same time, studies on motivations to vote find that citizens who believe their votes 
matter are significantly more likely to vote than those who believe their votes to have an 
insubstantial affect (Darmofal 2010). It thus seems reasonable voting is better inspired by a 
combination of fear of the opposite party and hope that one’s vote is important.  
Drawing from the comparison to voting, I further argue that not only can doom and 
gloom coexist with hope, but in the context of an avertable apocalypse such a combination is 
more effective in combatting climate change than either hope or fear by themselves. The reason 
is simple: both hope and fear are by themselves insufficient to motivate climate action. Hope for 
change promotes passivity: citizens who believe climate change to be a problem and have hope 
that it will be resolved may content themselves to allowing others to solve climate change. These 
citizens may hope for science to advance to the point of stopping climate change, even as they 
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themselves feel no urgency to act. A framing of climate change solely as apocalypse does the 
opposite, suggesting climate change will lead in a predetermined fashion to an ungodly end of 
days. To a citizen who believes climate change will lead to apocalypse but who doesn’t believe 
there is hope to stop it, there is absolute dread but again no motivation to act. Instead of either of 
these scenarios, citizens must frame climate change in terms of an apocalypse that may yet be 
averted by human action. Here the issue of climate change remains monumental in scope, 
creating a level of importance that is altogether absent in those who do not frame climate change 
as leading to apocalypse, while still providing hope in individual action to stop climate change. 
In this framework, the enormity of the climate change problem intersects with internal efficacy 
to bring citizens to believe that climate change is one of, if not the most, important of issues–and 
yet an issue that humans can have an impact on.  
There is one additional subtlety to add to how citizens should combine doom and gloom 
with hope in a manner that better promotes activism. Specifically, understanding the apocalypse 
as an injustice against future generations would better promote activism. This may seem to be 
inherently involved in apocalypticism–indeed I am arguing simply for an explicit enumeration 
noting the injustice of a climate apocalypse. This enumeration would likely stress that the 
injustice in climate change results from the fact that the humans living in the climate apocalypse 
will have had no hand in creating their plight. The benefit of enumerating the injustice inherent 
in a climate apocalypse is that it makes explicit another motivation for climate activism, without 
significantly reframing concepts. Indeed, Corner, Markowitz, and Pidgeon (2014) note that 
concern about the injustice climate change would bring is one of the primary predictors of 
climate activism (414). 
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In this section, I have argued for framing climate change as a disaster that may yet be 
averted through human action, and that if humans fail to prevent climate change, it will cause an 
apocalyptic future that would constitute an extreme injustice against future generations. The 
benefits of such a portrayal of climate change extend beyond those mentioned in this section, as 
we will see that such portrayals render another useful concept more palatable, namely sacrifice. 
However, before fully exploring how sacrifice fits into the framing citizens must use around 
climate change, a description of the societal underpinnings and hidden principles that have led to 
climate change is necessary.  
 
Theoretic underpinnings of climate change 
I shall now explore how particular neoliberal and capitalist economic theories are at fault 
for causing and perpetuating climate change. According to Stephan James Purdey (2012), the 
primary theoretical cause of climate change has been a preference for unconstrained capital 
growth (80-81). Purdey continues on to explain that this preference for unconstrained growth is 
in many ways a physical manifestation of an unwillingness in modern society to ask specific 
individuals or groups to make sacrifices (81-82). Instead, by simply advocating policies of 
continued economic growth, higher living standards can be promised to all. Yet to fuel a 
continuously growing economy, a continuously growing pool of resources will be needed, and an 
increasingly large amount of waste will be produced. Purdey concludes that, in the end, it is this 
unwillingness to address inequality that causes climate change (92). While Purdey does not 
explicitly call it sacrifice, it is not a stretch to say that the unconstrained capitalism Purdey 
claims has led to climate change is simply a sacrifice of both the future health of the world and 
8
Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol6/iss2/2
	 Gregg	8	
the current livelihood of those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. I will return to this 
connection to sacrifice later.  
While a preference for unconstrained growth may ultimately be the root cause of climate 
change, the concept of consumer sovereignty is a closely related and similarly problematic 
normative offshoot. According to Thomas Princen (2010), consumer sovereignty is the idea that 
“its all about the consumer; consumers exercise free choice; the consumer is the decider, indeed 
the ruler” (145). This theory in many ways seems to be a direct result of the theory of supply and 
demand, such that it makes little sense to critique consumer sovereignty, unless one disagrees 
with the principle of supply and demand. Yet according to Princen, consumer sovereignty is not 
inherent (148). Furthermore, shielding consumer sovereignty from a normative discussion of 
costs and benefits fails to address whether the concept is a cause of climate change. Princen’s 
main concern with consumer sovereignty, however, is that it insidiously allows companies to 
remove any responsibility they otherwise would have to combat climate change, instead putting 
all the responsibility on consumers (152).  
Understanding the root causes of climate change, enumerated above, is useful for two 
reasons. First, the above concepts return this paper to why climate activism must be political. 
Since it is but a small number of companies that are the primary contributors to climate change, 
there is extremely limited utility in attempting to prevent climate change through individual 
abstinence from consumption, as the fact remains that companies themselves are acting to 
constrain individual choice. Furthermore, since Americans do not by their own economic 
decisions have a substantial impact on the companies that are responsible for climate change, any 
reduction in emissions on the scale that is needed must be political in nature. Here we return to 
why Arendt’s conception of political power is useful. For Arendt, power is not derived from 
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individual actors with great strength, but instead from groups of people who want to see change. 
If political power simply signified military or economic strength, there would be little hope in 
preventing climate change, as the economically strong are the main contributors to climate 
change. But if, as Arendt holds, political power arises from the coming together of citizens, then 
it follows that citizens are able to impact climate change so long as they act in large enough 
groups. This definition of political action is thus in line with our requirement that Americans 
believe they have the agency to prevent climate change.  
In this section, I have noted the arguments that climate change has its theoretic roots both 
in a preference for unconstrained economic growth, and in the concept known as consumer 
sovereignty. Understanding the role these theories have had in causing and perpetuating climate 
change is important, as it provides a basis for my definition of political power. Furthermore, 
analyzing the normative preference in the U.S. for economic growth and how it arises from an 
unwillingness to sacrifice sets up the next topic of this paper, sacrifice.  
 
Sacrifice 
One issue that has not been addressed yet in this paper is how citizens concerned with 
climate change may avoid having their passion wane as they embark in activism. I believe the 
solution here is that the somewhat contested idea of sacrifice is itself a necessary 
conceptualization of climate change. The reason that such a concept would be helpful is as 
follows: by conceiving of political climate activism as involving sacrifice before citizens engage 
in it, those citizens will be better prepared for any surprises that may arise due to the at times 
onerous nature of political activism. Activism requires significant amounts of time, and an 
understanding that this is the case from the outset would allow citizens to avoid misinterpreting 
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the amount of commitment required. In addition, understanding climate change in terms of 
sacrifice would better enable climate activists to act as role models for what they believe society 
must do. Here I am not arguing that activists should sacrifice modern lifestyles in hopes that it 
will impact climate change. While activists certainly may sacrifice modern lifestyles if they 
wish, such a sacrifice does not qualify as political climate action: sacrificing lifestyles is an 
individual act and thus does not include the coming together of people that political climate 
action requires. What I am arguing is that activists who conceptualize climate change in terms of 
sacrifice may better be able to promote climate change policies. While framing climate change as 
sacrifice may seem counterintuitive, it has been argued that one of the main reasons citizens 
haven’t latched onto carbon tax policies is that they haven’t been framed in terms of sacrifice 
(Gunster 2010). The question then remains how to make sacrifice a palatable concept.  
To make climate sacrifice an acceptable conception and activity for climate activists, they 
both must understand the hidden sacrifices promoted by America’s individualized and growth 
orientated culture, and understand the consequences that would be caused by a lack of sacrifice 
in the form of climate activism. The first of these two tasks is explained extensively by Maniates, 
Meyer, and their contributors, in The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice (2010). Throughout the 
chapters of this book, the sacrifices that are made in society as it currently stands are laid bare. 
These sacrifices are quite numerous, including rather momentous sacrifices for especially 
integral parts of American society. Such examples include the statistic that each day 150 
Americans are killed by cars, an indication of society’s preference for personal vehicles even if it 
means American deaths (Princen 2010, 152). Such a sacrifice would be unacceptable to 
Americans in many other contexts, largely because it would be more obvious.  
11
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The importance of sacrifice goes beyond understanding what sacrifices have been made, 
for there is often little to no democratic discussion involved in deciding what should be 
sacrificed. This is the case in the matter of the individualized and resource intensive living 
standards in the American economy. Most Americans have no choice but to own and drive a 
personal vehicle, and there are numerous other carbon intensive living patterns not truly decided 
upon by individual Americans (Williams 2010, 254). Instead, these actions are decided upon by 
the companies that benefit from these lifestyles through their advertisements to affect popular 
opinions and their lobbying to physically constrain the choices available to Americans (Princen 
2010, 152). What is essentially occurring here is a relatively small number of companies are 
causing practices that create extraordinary amounts of emissions and hiding it through the guise 
of consumer sovereignty. The wealthy few who benefit extraordinarily from the current societal 
order do so by sacrificing the future of humans. As this is clearly an extreme injustice, it follows 
that understanding that climate change is being caused by a few individuals and corporations 
sacrificing the future of the earth for their own gain is a conceptualization that may help promote 
activism. I shall proceed to explore how understanding climate change as sacrifice is helped by 
apocalypticism, even while understandings of sacrifice are themselves useful to framing climate 
change in terms of hope and fear. 
 
Relations between hope, fear, and sacrifice 
While understanding climate change as sacrifice is useful in its own right, the relation 
between sacrifice and hope and fear adds many beneficial nuances to framings of climate 
change. One massive benefit of apocalypticism is that it has the potential to overcome the 
psychology issue that humans have a hard time rationally reasoning in a manner that promotes 
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long term goals, a concept known in psychology as judgment discounting (Gifford 2011, 292-
293). Judgment discounting relates to climate change through the inability of humans to correctly 
judge the scope of climate change, instead estimating it to be significantly less dangerous than 
scientists suspect it will be (Gifford). Yet if climate change is framed by activists as leading to an 
apocalypse that ends human existence or life on earth, it is hard to imagine a worse result of 
climate change. Thus, by intentionally framing climate change in terms of apocalypse, humans 
may be able to attempt to counter judgement discounting. While it isn’t clear that apocalypticism 
is itself enough to combat judgement discounting, it nevertheless could prove beneficial in 
reducing the amount of discounting that occurs. If judgment discounting is effectively combated, 
it follows that humans would be willing to sacrifice more in the present than would otherwise be 
viewed as acceptable. 
Another useful connection between sacrifice and hope and fear is exemplified by the 
hidden sacrifice that is deadly automobile accidents. The reason this sacrifice is hidden from 
society is that the deaths involved have been framed as a tragedy rather than as a sacrifice. While 
tragedy and sacrifice are often used in similar contexts, the terms have meaningful differences. In 
its modern usage, tragedy is something that happens to people so that there is no agency in 
tragedy. By contrast, sacrifice is an act that often implies some level of consent, even if the 
consent occurs at a societal level (Hall 2010). Society hides the sacrifice involved in automobile 
accidents by framing them as tragedy. In this way, the consent society gives to automobile deaths 
is obscured, and the agency humans have in stopping the deaths is removed. Yet if America was 
to completely move to a mass transportation system, these deaths would be prevented. In this 
same sense, framing climate change as a form of sacrifice, rather than a form of a more passive 
concept such as tragedy, connotes that humans have the agency to stop climate change. The logic 
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of this argument is as follows: since sacrifice requires agency, and climate change is a form of 
sacrifice, it follows that humans have agency over climate change. In this manner, viewing 
climate change as a form of sacrifice helps activists to develop the exact type of hope in human 
agency I argue they must have.  
Apocalypticism is extremely useful in helping political climate activists to accept that 
sacrifices will be required in climate action. This benefit of apocalypticism comes from its ability 
to help bridge the gap caused by judgement discounting through the immense scale of the 
eventual sacrifice that is made by not sacrificing in the present. Furthermore, the nuanced 
connotations of sacrifice cause activists who frame climate change as sacrifice to believe they 
have agency over climate change. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I argue for an analytic framework that should energize citizens concerned 
with climate change to political climate action. My focus on political climate action comes from 
the normative roots of climate change, roots which suggest that individualized reductions in 
consumption are not enough, and that instead citizens must engage in political action that brings 
the government to act. I further suggest that since the preference for uncontrolled economic 
growth that has caused climate change primarily benefits relatively few individuals and 
corporations, which already have extreme political and economic clout, it makes sense to use the 
principles of group cooperation for forming political power that Arendt conceptualized.  
The subject of analysis in this paper is individuals in the United States. Since the US has 
such a large amount of global strength, in economic, military, and diplomatic forms, the example 
it sets is often followed by much of the world. Furthermore, since the United States is one of the 
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largest contributors to the climate change problem, and has substantial scientific and 
technological resources, it is unlikely that global climate agreements could properly function 
without the United States participating in them (Meyer 2016). As such, it makes logical sense to 
look for the normative framing devices that promote climate activism in the United States.  
In arguing for how citizens can energize themselves for political climate activism in the 
United States, I suggest citizens need a more nuanced approach than has previously been taken in 
framing climate change in terms of hope and fear. The primary basis of this argument was that 
both hope and fear are necessary for promoting climate activism, but must be used in different 
settings. Fear is necessary in the more abstract setting of what climate change will cause should 
humans fail to act sufficiently. Thus, the fear is of the future–an apocalyptic future that will 
occur if no action is taken. This fear should provide a strong form of motivation for political 
climate action. Hope is needed in the present. Individuals must have hope that their actions can 
cause the policy changes that are needed to sufficiently combat climate change. This internal 
political efficacy is needed to prevent the fear that motivates action from overcoming the will to 
fight and thus causing citizens to despair.  
Two additions were then added to the theory of hope and despair. First, the requirement 
that the apocalypse is framed in terms of the injustice it causes was added. The main benefit of 
such an enumeration was the belief by political scientists that climate action is strongly promoted 
by individual beliefs that climate change is a form of injustice. The second addition was that 
individuals must frame any climate action in terms of sacrifice. The benefit of framing climate 
change in terms of sacrifice is the potential that such a framing could help activists to avoid 
being shocked into complacency by the demanding nature of activism. In order that activists 
might find large sacrifices of their time to be acceptable, a discussion was then given as to the 
15
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necessity for activists to understand that climate change is itself a form of sacrifice. The paper 
then concluded with a brief remark on how the concepts of sacrifice, hope, and fear have 
surprising synergies that expand the usefulness each have as framings of climate change.  
In this paper, I have striven to create a framework that bridges the gap between activists 
who believe climate change is best seen as a likely apocalypse, and something that humans are 
yet likely to avoid. The intent of this analysis is to provide a framework for citizens to use to 
inspire themselves to climate action in even depressing political times. In the era of the Trump 
presidency, I hope this framework is useful. In terms of what the academic next step is however, 
a study of how such a framework can be used to bring otherwise uninterested citizens to climate 
action would be a monumental step forward.   
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